Protect credential transport from sudo I/O logging and report matched platforms
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@@ -67,14 +67,54 @@ def _profile_id(state):
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def _encrypt_credential(state, key, backend):
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_helper_ready()
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if backend == HOST_BACKEND:
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_helper_ready()
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args = ["sudo", "-n", "--", str(HELPER), "protect", _profile_id(state)]
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kind = "host"
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command = [str(HELPER), "protect", _profile_id(state)]
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elif backend == USER_BACKEND:
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args = ["sudo", "-n", "--", "systemd-creds", "encrypt", "--uid=" + str(os.getuid()), "--with-key=host", "--name=" + CREDENTIAL, "-", "-"]
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kind = "user"
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command = ["/usr/bin/systemd-creds", "encrypt", "--uid=" + str(os.getuid()), "--with-key=host", "--name=" + CREDENTIAL, "-", "-"]
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else:
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raise RuntimeError("Unsupported protected-credential backend.")
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return _command(args, data=key.encode()).stdout
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# Bootstrap is administratively authorized and carries no runtime key.
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# A command-specific effective-policy check precedes ALL secret input.
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_command(["sudo", "-n", "--", str(HELPER), "authorize", _profile_id(state), kind])
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try:
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_require_no_sudo_io_logging(command)
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return _command(["sudo", "-n", "--", *command], data=key.encode()).stdout
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finally:
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# Host protect consumes its grant before reading input. A missing
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# cancel grant after that successful consume is harmless. Native user
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# encryption cannot consume the grant itself, so cancellation is strict.
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_command(["sudo", "-n", "--", str(HELPER), "unauthorize", _profile_id(state), kind], check=kind == "user")
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def _require_no_sudo_io_logging(command):
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environment = dict(os.environ, LANG="C", LC_ALL="C")
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result = _command(["sudo", "-n", "-ll", "--", *command], env=environment)
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error = "The effective sudo policy must explicitly disable input/output logging for this exact credential command. No runtime key was sent."
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if result.returncode or len(result.stdout) > 131072:
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raise RuntimeError(error)
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try:
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text = result.stdout.decode("utf-8")
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except UnicodeDecodeError:
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raise RuntimeError(error) from None
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# sudo 1.9's command-specific verbose list reports the effective matching
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# rule. Unknown/ambiguous formats (including other policy plugins) fail
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# closed; absence of log_* in generic Defaults is never accepted as proof.
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if text.count("Sudoers entry:") != 1 or len(re.findall(r"^\s*Matched:", text, re.M)) != 1:
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raise RuntimeError(error)
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options = re.search(r"^\s*Options:\s*(.*?)^\s*Commands:\s*$", text, re.M | re.S)
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matched = re.search(r"^\s*Matched:\s*(.*?)\s*\Z", text, re.M | re.S)
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run_as = re.findall(r"^\s*RunAsUsers:\s*(.*?)\s*$", text, re.M)
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if not options or not matched or run_as != ["root"]:
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raise RuntimeError(error)
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flags = {value.strip() for value in options[1].replace("\n", " ").split(",")}
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logs = {"log_input", "log_output", "log_stdin", "log_stdout", "log_stderr", "log_ttyin", "log_ttyout"}
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if not {"!log_input", "!log_output", "!setenv"}.issubset(flags) or logs.intersection(flags):
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raise RuntimeError(error)
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if " ".join(matched[1].split()) != " ".join(command):
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raise RuntimeError(error)
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def _revoke_helper(state, digest):
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@@ -176,8 +216,8 @@ def _json(path, value, replace=False):
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_write(path, (json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, indent=2) + "\n").encode(), replace)
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def _command(args, *, data=None, timeout=35, check=True):
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result = subprocess.run(args, input=data, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, timeout=timeout)
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def _command(args, *, data=None, timeout=35, check=True, env=None):
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result = subprocess.run(args, input=data, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, timeout=timeout, env=env)
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if check and result.returncode:
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raise RuntimeError("Autostart command failed: " + Path(args[0]).name + ". No command output was exported.")
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return result
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@@ -752,7 +792,9 @@ def _credential(state):
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resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_CORE, (0, 0))
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if _credential_backend(record) == HOST_BACKEND:
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_helper_ready()
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result = _command(["sudo", "-n", "--", str(HELPER), "decrypt", _profile_id(state), record["credential_sha256"]], timeout=15)
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command = [str(HELPER), "decrypt", _profile_id(state), record["credential_sha256"]]
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_require_no_sudo_io_logging(command)
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result = _command(["sudo", "-n", "--", *command], timeout=15)
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else:
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result = _command(["systemd-creds", "decrypt", "--user", "--name=" + CREDENTIAL, "-", "-"], data=cipher, timeout=15)
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try:
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